















More causal pictures with bits and pieces of my life: notes from college, books, and my anime figure. 🥰 🌟 Thinking about non-existent objects: If a nonexistent object is an object that does not exist, then the existence of the concept itself must presuppose it exists. The problem of non-existent objects appears trivial on the face of it, but its implications are expensive and its concerns extend deep into formal logic and the philosophy of language. My favorite example of a non-existent object is the unicorn. A unicorn has the characteristics of looking like a horse and having a horn on its forehead. How is it we are able to attribute properties to an object that does not have the existence to instantiate them? Are there ontic commitments that must be made in order to uphold this far reaching ontology of non-existent objects? The philosopher that is known for his philosophy of non-existent objects is Meinong, who says that non-existent objects such as the round square or the golden mountain don’t exist but subsist. The proposition “the golden mountain exists” is false and “the golden mountain does not exist” is true, but how can the latter proposition be true if the negative existential quantifier is quantified over a non-existent object? Or maybe that’s what we get for disobeying Kant and making existence a predicate.